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N the early hours of July 23, 1999, the Swisher County Sheriff's De-
partment invaded the African-American community in the small west
Texas town of Tulia in what appeared to be an arrest rampage.2 The
officers beat on doors, woke-up neighbors, and pulled men and women
from their beds-all to arrest them in front of bright lights and TV news
cameras swarming about the neighborhood. 3 In the end, the officers ar-
rested forty-six people-nearly ten percent of the adult African-Ameri-
can population of a town of 5,100 people. Forty of the forty-six arrested
were African-American, and the remaining six had bi-racial children or
were married to someone in the African-American community.
4
The Swisher County Sheriff's Department arrested the accused based
only on the accusations of one newly hired undercover officer, Tom Cole-
man, without any other corroborating evidence that the people arrested
sold drugs. 5 The officer did not wear a recording device, operate video
surveillance, or utilize a second officer to observe the deals; nor did he
ever produce any drugs.6 The new officer explained that the only means
he used to record the alleged transactions was by writing the names,
dates, and other details in ink on his leg. 7 Although this officer had a
history of theft, fraud, and abuse of power in his previous law enforce-
ment positions, one by one the arrestees were convicted in trials at which
the judge refused to allow evidence of the officer's previous work record,
1. 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
2. See generally Complaint at 5, White v. Coleman, No. 2-03CV-0272J, 2004 WL
573657 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
3. Id. at 22.
4. Id. at 5.
5. Id.
6. Adam Liptak, $5 Million Settlement Ends Case of Tainted Texas Sting, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2004, at A14.




and the attorneys never cross-examined the officer. 8
However, these charges were false and full of inaccuracies. The victims
included people such as Billy Don Wafer, who was alleged to have bought
drugs at a convenience store; however, Wafer provided time sheets and
witnesses establishing that he was at work at the time of the purported
drug sale.9 Another defendant, Yul Bryant, had been described as a
"'tall black man with bushy type hair,"' but Bryant is actually 5'6" and
bald.10 Coleman also accused Yolanda Smith of selling him drugs on Feb-
ruary 14, 1998, at a time when the officer's time sheets indicated that he
was off duty.l ' Coleman described Romona Strickland in the original in-
cident report as "'six months pregnant,"' when she in fact was not preg-
nant at all. 12 On the date Coleman alleged that Tonya White delivered
him drugs within 1,000 feet of a playground, she was actually living in
Oklahoma City. 13 White even produced a time-stamped check from a
bank in Oklahoma City dated the day of the alleged drug deal.1 4
After becoming aware of the unjust situation in early 2001, a team of
attorneys from the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the ACLU, and Hogan
& Hartson L.L.P., a Washington, D.C. law firm, began investigating the
convictions and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of
those who had already been convicted at trial.' 5 The hearing for the writs
of habeas petition revealed that Coleman falsified reports, misrepre-
sented the nature and extent of his investigative work, and misidentified
various defendants during his Tulia investigation. 1 6 It also revealed that
Coleman committed perjury during numerous prior hearings and trials
and had been "described by prior employers as a 'discipline problem'
who 'had possible mental problems."1 7 Judge Chapman's 130-page Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law based on the hearings reported that
the "prosecution had withheld critical impeachment material" and de-
scribed Coleman as "the most devious, non-responsive law enforcement
witness this Court has witnessed in 25 years on the bench in Texas;" and
"it would be a 'travesty of justice' for the Tulia convictions to stand.' 8
On June 16, 2003, the Court ordered the immediate release of twelve
8. Id. at 6; Open Society Policy Center, Tulia Tip of the Drug War Iceberg, 43-44 (Jan.2005), http://www.soros.org/resources/articles-publications/publications/tulia-2005010l/tu-
lia.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Tulia Tip of the Drug War Iceberg].




12. Id. (quoting the incident report).
13. Id. at 24.
14. Id.
15. Tulia Tip of the Drug War Iceberg, supra note 8, at 42; see also Hogan & Hartson
L.L.P., The Tulia Case, http://www.hhlaw.com/News/25813Tulia.pdf (last visited Sept. 10,2005) [hereinafter Hogan & Hartson] (explaining background of Tulia case and Hogan &
Hartson's work in the case).





individuals who had been imprisoned since the Tulia raid in July 1999.19
Governor Rick Perry then granted full pardons on August 22, 2003, to
thirty-five individuals who were wrongfully convicted in Tulia.20 On
March 11, 2004, the arrestees reached a $5 million settlement with the
City of Amarillo in their civil suit.21 Finally, on January 14, 2005, a Texas
state court jury found that Coleman had committed perjury while testify-
ing in another proceeding about an allegation from his previous law en-
forcement position.22
The arrests in Tulia, Texas, despite the final outcome, illustrate that
race is still an issue in law enforcement and prosecutorial decisions. Fred-
die Brookins, whose nineteen-year-old son was arrested in Tulia only
weeks before he planned to start college, testified at the Congressional
Briefing on Tulia in Washington, D.C. on May 7, 2003, and stated, "I
thought that they made a mistake. I didn't think the law did things like
this. I didn't think things like this happened in this day and time."' 23 The
government, however, has always had leeway in making its prosecutorial
decisions, but that does not mean that its discretion is unbounded.2 4 The
Supreme Court in United States v. Armstrong reaffirmed that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits selective prosecution on the basis of race.
25
However, to make a selective prosecution claim, as explained by the
Court, the defendant faces a high hurdle.26 He must prove that the "fed-
eral prosecutorial policy 'had a discriminatory effect, and it was moti-
vated by a discriminatory purpose." 27 While the Court explained that to
establish discriminatory effect one must demonstrate that "similarly situ-
ated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted, '28 the Court did
not provide any explanation on how to prove discriminatory intent for a
selective prosecution claim.29 Commentators have argued that Arm-
strong makes it more difficult to prove selective prosecution cases, while
others are concerned that the door should not be opened to speculative
discrimination claims.30
This Comment seeks to reconcile these conflicting views and recom-
mends that courts apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting frame-
work used in employment race discrimination cases to clarify the test for
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Liptak, supra note 6, at A14.
22. Steve Barnes, Rogue Narcotics Agent in Texas is Found Guilty in Perjury Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2005, at A12.
23. Tulia Tip of the Drug War Iceberg, supra note 8, at 30 (Part II Congressional Brief-
ing: "Systemic Injustice in the War on Drugs: A Briefing from the Frontlines of Tulia, Texas
and Beyond"-May 7, 2003).
24. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996).
25. Id. at 465.
26. See id.
27. Id. (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See infra note 115 (discussing criticisms of Armstrong).
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selective prosecution based on race.31 Part I describes the background of
selective prosecution claims and key cases that the Supreme Court con-
sidered in its analysis in Armstrong. Part II reviews the Court's decision
in Armstrong and explains the Court's holding. Part III discusses
problems with the Armstrong opinion, including the high burden of proof
standard in selective prosecution cases, the difficulty in obtaining statis-
tics to meet the standard, and the Supreme Court's lack of a clear defini-
tion of discriminatory intent. Part IV explains the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework used in employment discrimination cases to
determine discriminatory racial intent and describes this Comment's pro-
posal on how to apply the McDonnell Douglas framework to selective
prosecution based on race. Finally, Part V explains the importance of
applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to selective prosecution
claims, especially in light of the increased use of racial profiling today in a
variety of contexts.
I. BACKGROUND OF SELECTIVE PROSECUTION CLAIMS
To understand the background of selective prosecution claims, one
must begin with the power to prosecute. The executive branch is granted
the power under the Constitution to execute the laws. 32 This power af-
fords the Attorney General and United States Attorneys "'broad discre-
tion." 33 "[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that
the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision...
31. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). Race, of course,
has long received special consideration. In Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944),
the Supreme Court first used the term "suspect" to describe a racial classification, which
would then trigger "most rigid scrutiny" in equal protection analysis. Id. at 216.
32. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed."). Therefore, the prosecutors serve as the "President's delegates" to
help him fulfill his responsibility as provided for in the Constitution. United States v. Arm-
strong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). In addition, the United States Code also codifies grants of
prosecutorial discretion. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 516 (2004) (providing that "the conduct of
litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is party, or is interested,
and securing evidence therefore, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under
the direction of the Attorney General."); see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 547 (2004), which
provided:
Except as otherwise provided by law, each United States attorney, within his district,
shall-
(1) prosecute for all offenses against the United States; (2) prosecute or de-
fend for the Government, all civil actions, suits or proceedings in which the
United States is concerned; (3) appear in behalf of the defendants in all civil
actions, suits or proceedings pending in his district against collectors, or other
officers of the revenue or customs for any act done by them or for the recov-
ery of any money exacted by or paid to these officers, and by them paid into
the Treasury; (4) institute and prosecute proceedings for the collection of
fines, penalties, and forfeitures incurred for violation of any revenue law,
unless satisfied on investigation that justice does not require the proceedings;
and (5) make such reports as the Attorney General may direct.
33. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (citing Wayte v. United




generally rests entirely in [the prosecutor's] discretion." 34
Although the power of prosecutorial discretion is broad, it is not "'un-
fettered' . . [it is] subject to constitutional restraints.'"35 These "consti-
tutional restraints" for federal prosecutors include the equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment, which
has the same restraint as the equal protection guarantee under the Four-
teenth Amendment for state prosecutors.36 Therefore, due to these con-
stitutional constraints, the decision to prosecute cannot be based on "an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification." 3
7
A. SELECTIVE PROSECUTION DEFINED
"A selective prosecution claim asks a court to exercise its judicial
power over a 'special province' of the Executive. '38 Selective prosecu-
tion is not a defense to the criminal charge itself.39 Instead, it forms the
basis for a motion to dismiss if the decision of a prosecutor was based on
an unconstitutional rationale.40 The claim is based on "ordinary equal
protection standards. '41 This requires the defendant to prove "that the
prosecutorial policy 'had [both] a discriminatory effect and that it was
34. Id. (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)).
35. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608 (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125
(1979)). Moreover, the role of prosecutorial discretion has increased with the use of sen-
tencing guidelines, state and federal. Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion,
86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 756-58 (1996).
36. Wayte, 470 U.S. 598 at 610 (citing Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975)).
37. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
38. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832
(1985)).
39. Id. at 463; see also In re United States, 397 F.3d 274, 286 (5th Cir. 2005) (explaining
that "[racially selective prosecution is a challenge to the prosecution, not a defense to the
crime charged."). In In re United States, Tyrone Williams was prosecuted for driving a
truck as part of an illegal alien smuggling conspiracy, in which nineteen of the seventy-four
illegal aliens who were inside the truck trailer died of heat exhaustion in Victoria, Texas.
Id. at 277. Out of the fourteen co-defendants, Williams was the only African-American
defendant besides one other and the only defendant for whom the government sought the
death penalty. Id. at 278. The district court applied the Armstrong standard requiring
proof of discriminatory effect and intent and found that the defendant had made a prima
facie case because the requirements were "clear to the naked eye." Id. The lower court
granted the defendant's motion for discovery of information relating to the government's
capital-charging practices. Id. at 279. However, on an interlocutory appeal, the Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed and held that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed discovery
sanctions on the government requiring it to disclose its reasoning for seeking the death
penalty for the defendant. Id. at 285-86. The trial court judge had planned to instruct the
jury that it could decide whether the government's decision to seek the death penalty was
selective prosecution. See id. at 281. However, the Fifth Circuit criticized this jury instruc-
tion because it would turn selective prosecution into a defense. See id. at 286.
40. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463. Although this Comment focuses on the use of a
selective prosecution claim based on racial discrimination as grounds for a motion to dis-
miss an indictment, selective prosecution claims have also been used to seek damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of civil rights by state officials. See, e.g., Chavez v. Ill.
State Police, 251 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2001); see also infra, notes 199-210 and accompanying
text (discussing Chavez).
41. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985).
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motivated by a discriminatory purpose prosecution.'" 42 A selective pros-
ecution claim "begins with a presumption of good faith and constitutional
compliance by the prosecutors. '43 "'Clear evidence to the contrary'" is
required to prove that the prosecutor was not making decisions that con-
formed to the Constitution.44 However, because the claim requires thejudiciary to review the decisions of the executive, the Supreme Court has
been hesitant to allow the judiciary to upset a decision of the
prosecution. 45
Nevertheless, the broad power that prosecutors wield has been criti-
cized.46 Even Justice Jackson, a former prosecutor, recognized the prob-
lem when he referred to the prosecutor's decision to prosecute as "'the
most dangerous power of the prosecutor,' because it enables the prosecu-
tor to 'pick people he thinks he should get, rather than pick cases that
need to be prosecuted.'" 47 Jackson also noted that prosecutors are capa-
ble of finding a violation in almost anyone, which means that prosecution
"becomes personal, and the real crime becomes that of being unpopular
with the predominant or governing group, being attached to the wrong
political views, or being personally obnoxious to or in the way of the
prosecutor. '48 When this "most dangerous power" is exercised by prose-
cutors who discriminate either intentionally or even unintentionally, de-
fendants can become victims of selective prosecution.
B. DEVELOPMENTS IN SELECTIVE PROSECUTION LITIGATION
Selective prosecution as a claim has evolved since it was first discussed
in a Supreme Court case in 1886. In Armstrong, the Supreme Court re-
viewed four key cases that have impacted the development of selective
prosecution in its discriminatory intent analysis. 49 In two cases, discrimi-
nation against Chinese persons was at issue, and in the other two cases,
Caucasian defendants asserted that they were targeted for special
prosecution.
42. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (quoting Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456).
43. See United States, 397 F.3d at 284 (citing Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465-66).
44. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272
U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)).
45. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (explaining that the judiciary is not in a position to
review factors used to decide to prosecute such as: "the strength of the case, the prosecu-
tion's general deterrence value, the government's enforcement priorities, and the case's
relationship to the government's overall enforcement plan"). The Court also indicated
that judicial review would delay criminal proceedings, "threaten [ I to chill law enforce-
ment" by revealing prosecutors' decision-making process to outsiders, and reduce
prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the government's enforcement policy. Id.
46. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM,
81 (1975) (Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1978) (quoting address by Justice Robert Jackson, Sec-
ond Annual Conference of U.S. Attorneys, April 1940).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464-67.
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1. The Supreme Court Confronts Selective Prosecution of Chinese in
California
Yick Wo v. Hopkins5° is the first opinion in which the Supreme Court
recognized that equal protection standards apply to prosecution.51 In
Yick Wo, the defendant, Wo, a native of China, had operated a laundry
business in San Francisco for twenty-two years.52 When he tried to renew
his license, the board of fire-wardens informed him that he was in viola-
tion of a new city ordinance prohibiting laundries in wooden buildings
and arrested him when he did not pay the fine.53 Wo petitioned the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he had
been deprived of his personal liberty.54 The case then went to the United
States Supreme Court on a writ of error to the California Supreme
Court.5 5 In reviewing the ordinance, the Court noted that in 1880, of the
320 laundries in San Francisco, 310 were housed in wooden buildings.
56
Wo presented evidence that of 280 people who applied for licenses from
the fire-warden, all 80 non-Chinese received a license, even though their
laundries were in wooden structures, and all 200 Chinese applicants were
denied.57 The Supreme Court observed that the effect of the ordinance
would be to drive the small laundries owned by Chinese out of business
and to give a monopoly to the large laundry operations owned by Cauca-
sians. 58 More importantly, the Court inferred that the ordinance was in-
tended to discriminate against the Chinese and "not merely to regulate
the business for the public safety."'59 The Supreme Court, accordingly,
held that the ordinance violated equal protection because the govern-
ment only prosecuted the violators who were Chinese. 60 As the Court
explained, a defendant may demonstrate that the administration of a
criminal law is "directed so exclusively against a particular class of per-
sons... with a mind so unequal and oppressive" that the system of prose-
cution amounts to "a practical denial" of equal protection of the law.
61
Thus, the Court held that Yick Wo's imprisonment was illegal and it re-
versed and remanded the case with instructions to release Yick Wo from
prison.62
Twenty years later, the Supreme Court considered the issue of selective
prosecution again in Ah Sin v. Wittman,63 another case involving discrimi-
50. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
51. See LEXSTAT 2-9 CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 9.04-Decision to Prose-
cute (Matthew Bender & Co. 2004).
52. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 358.
53. Id. at 358-59.
54. Id. at 356.
55. Id. at 365.
56. Id. at 358-59.
57. Id. at 359.
58. Id. at 362-63.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 374.
61. Id. at 373.
62. Id. at 374.
63. 198 U.S. 500 (1905).
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nation against Chinese, in which the Court established the requirement of
proving discriminatory effect. 64 In Ah Sin, the defendant filed a habeas
petition while imprisoned for violating a San Francisco ordinance prohib-
iting gambling tables in rooms with barricades in place to prevent police
from entering.65 Ah Sin simply alleged in his habeas petition that the
ordinance itself was enforced only against Chinese and not against any
other races.66 In its opinion, however, the Court affirmed the dismissal of
the petition and held that discriminatory effect had to be established by a
showing that people of other races who were similarly situated were
treated differently.67 Since the defendant did not allege that the ordi-
nance's prohibited practices were not exclusively committed by Chinese
and did not show that there were other non-Chinese violators of the ordi-
nance who were not prosecuted, Ah Sin could not show discriminatory
effect.68
2. Selective Prosecution Claims in Non-Race Cases Establish the
Modern Test
The Supreme Court reviewed selective prosecution again in 1962 in
Oyler v. Boles, in which the Court explained that proof must establish
that the decision to prosecute was not based on an "unjustifiable stan-
dard. ' '69 Oyler did not involve racial discrimination, but it concerned two
petitioners who alleged that they were discriminated against as habitual
criminals and were given life sentences under the West Virginia habitual
criminal statute.70 Both filed separate writs of habeas corpus to appeal
the sentences on the grounds of equal protection violations. 71 They sub-
mitted statistics indicating that a "high percentage of those subject to the
law" had not received life sentences.72 The Court rejected the statistics
explaining that the "conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement
is not in itself a federal constitutional violation. ' 73 Although the statistics
implied some selective enforcement of the statute, there was no indica-
tion that it was "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as
race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. '74
Over twenty years ago, in Wayte v. United States, the Court first stated
64. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (citing Ah Sin, 198 U.S. at 500).
65. Id. at 466; Ah Sin, 198 U.S. at 503.
66. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 466.
67. Id.
68. Id.; Ah Sin, 198 U.S. at 507-08; see also infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text(explaining the difference between the ordinances in Yick Wo and Ah Sin as distinguished
by the Court in Armstrong).
69. 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
70. Id. at 449 (involving habitual criminal statute assigning mandatory life sentence
upon third conviction of a crime punishable by imprisonment).
71. Id. at 454.





a two-prong test for a selective prosecution claim.75 The Court explained
that the claim is based on equal protection standards and specified that
the "standards require [the] petitioner to show both that the passive en-
forcement system had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by
a discriminatory purpose. '76 In Wayte, another non-racial selective pros-
ecution case, the petitioner refused to comply with a 1980 Presidential
Proclamation requiring males born during 1960 to register with the Selec-
tive Service System.77 The petitioner was in the group of men required to
register; however, he refused to do so and sent letters to government offi-
cials informing them that he did not register and did not intend to regis-
ter.78 The Selective Service saved the letter in its files, and as a part of its
"passive enforcement" policy of only prosecuting unregistered persons in
their file, notified the petitioner that if he did not register, he would be
prosecuted. 79 After several letters and a visit by an FBI agent, he was
indicted for knowingly and willfully failing to register in violation of the
Military Selective Service Act.80 Wayte moved to dismiss the indictment
on the ground of selective prosecution. 81 The Supreme Court held that
Wayte was not selectively prosecuted because he did not show that the
reason the Selective Service chose to prosecute the nonregistrants that it
did was because they sent in letters voicing their refusal to register.82 It
also noted that Wayte did not prove that the policy had a discriminatory
effect. 83
II. THE SELECTIVE PROSECUTION STANDARD UNDER
UNITED STATES V. ARMSTRONG 84
United States v. Armstrong addressed the standard that must be met to
obtain discovery in a selective prosecution claim based on race.85 The
defendants, Armstrong and Hampton, were arrested by agents of the
Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and the narcotics divi-
sion of the local police department after they sold undercover agents
crack cocaine seven times and the police searched their hotel room where
more crack and a loaded gun were found. 86 The defendants were in-
dicted on charges of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute and
75. 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985). The Armstrong Court quoted Wayte as the authority for
the standards of a selective prosecution claim when it stated the requirements that it ap-
plied in the Armstrong analysis. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996).
76. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608.
77. Id. at 600-01.
78. Id. at 601.
79. Id. at 602.
80. Id. at 603.
81. Id. at 604.
82. Id. at 609-10.
83. Id.
84. 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
85. Id. at 458. Armstrong specifically involved Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure 16-Discovery and Inspection. Therefore, it was at the evidentiary hearing




conspiring to distribute more than fifty grams of cocaine as well as on
federal firearm offenses. 87 After the indictment, they filed a motion for
discovery or for dismissal of the indictment, alleging that they were cho-
sen for federal prosecution because they were African-American.8 8 In
support of the motion, the defendants attached an affidavit by a "Parale-
gal Specialist" at the Office of the Federal Public Defender stating that in
each of the twenty-four prosecutions for crack cocaine cases closed in
1991, the defendants were African-American. 89 They also included a list
of the defendants' names, races, and alleged crimes. 90
Over the government's objection, the district court granted the motion
and ordered the government:
(1) to provide a list of all cases from the last three years in which the
government charged both cocaine and firearms offenses; (2) to iden-
tify the race of the defendants in those cases; (3) to identify what
levels of law enforcement were involved in the investigations of
those cases; and (4) to explain its criteria for deciding to prosecute
those defendants for federal cocaine offenses. 91
The government moved for reconsideration of the discovery order but
the motion was denied. 92 When the government said it would not comply
with the discovery order, the court dismissed the case. 93 The Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed the district court, indicating that due to the proof require-
ment for a selective prosecution claim, defendants must provide a basis
for believing that "others similarly situated have not been prosecuted. '94
However, the Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc and affirmed the
district court's order of dismissal, holding that a "defendant is not re-
quired to demonstrate that the government has failed to prosecute others
who are similarly situated. '95
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's en banc
decision. 96 First, the Court analyzed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16-Discovery and Inspection, which was not considered by the lower
courts.97 Rule 16(a)(1)(C) provides:
Upon request of the defendant the government shall permit the de-
fendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, docu-
ments, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies
or portions thereof, which are within the possession, custody or con-
trol of the government, and which are material to the preparation of
87. Id.




92. Id. at 459-61.
93. Id. at 461.
94. Id. (quoting United States v. Armstrong, 21 F.3d 1431, 1436 (9th Cir. 1994) (quot-
ing United States v. Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1983), affd, 470 U.S. 598 (1985)).
95. Id. at 461.
96. Id. at 461, 470-71.
97. Id. at 461-62.
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the defendant's defense or are intended for use by the government as
evidence in chief at the trial, or were obtained from or belong to the
defendant. 98
The defendants "argue[d] that the documents 'within the possession...
of the government' that discuss the government's prosecution strategy for
cocaine cases are 'material' to respondents' selective-prosecution claim,"
and that Rule 16 should apply because a claim that "'results in noncon-
viction' if successful is a 'defense"' under the application of the Rule. 99
However, the Supreme Court explained that under Rule 16 "'the defen-
dant's defense' means the defendant's response to the government's case
in chief." 10 0 Therefore, the Court held "that Rule 16(a)(1)(C) authorizes
defendants to examine government documents material to the prepara-
tion of their defense against the government's case in chief, but not to the
preparation of selective-prosecution claims."1 0 1
The Court explained that a prosecutor's decision to prosecute is re-
viewable by the court; however, the defendant must meet the proper
threshold showing for selective prosecution.1 0 2 Drawing on equal protec-
tion standards, the court held that the defendant claiming selective prose-
cution must show that the federal prosecutorial policy "had a
discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory pur-
pose."' 0 3 To establish discriminatory effect in a selective prosecution
case based on race, the defendant making the claim must prove that "sim-
ilarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted."' 104
The Court explained that this requirement, coming from ordinary equal
protection standards, was recognized in Ah Sin v. Wittman. 10 5 The Court
did not believe that the "similarly situated" requirement makes a selec-
tive prosecution claim too difficult to prove since this requirement was
proven in 1886 in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.10 6 Since Yick Wo was a successful
case of selective prosecution, the court distinguishes it from Ah Sin, by
explaining that the city ordinance in Yick Wo was "'discriminatory in ten-
dency and ultimate actual operation"' while the criminal law in Ah Sin
was made discriminatory "by the manner of its administration.' ' 0 7
The Court concluded that to establish entitlement to discovery on a
claim of selective prosecution based on race, the defendant making the
98. Id. at 461-62 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C)).
99. Id. at 462 (quoting oral argument transcript).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 463; see also KATHLEEN M. BRINKMAN & GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LITIGATION MANUAL 148 (2003) (explaining the impact of Arm-
strong on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16).
102. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463.
103. Id. at 465 (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 465-67 (discussing Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500 (1905)); see also discus-
sion supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (explaining background and holding of Ah
Sin).
106. Id. (discussing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
107. Id. at 466 (quoting Ah Sin, 198 U.S. at 508); see also supra notes 52-57 and accom-
panying text (explaining the discriminatory manner of the administration of the law).
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selective prosecution claim must produce credible evidence that similarly
situated defendants of other races could have been but were not prose-
cuted.10 8 This is established by looking for "'some evidence tending to
show the existence of the essential elements of the defense,' discrimina-
tory effect and discriminatory intent." 10 9 Although requiring prima facie
evidence before allowing discovery to obtain evidence appears to be a
"Catch 22," the Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit incorrectly
concluded that one can "establish a colorable basis for discriminatory ef-
fect without evidence that the government has failed to prosecute others
who are similarly situated to the defendant."' 10 The Court believed that
the Ninth Circuit wrongly assumed that people of all races commit all
types of crimes, instead of considering that there may be certain crimes
that are generally committed only by one racial or ethnic group.'
The Supreme Court found that the "study" and the list of twenty-four
African-American defendants who were also prosecuted for possession
and dealing of cocaine did not "'tend[ ] to show the existence of the es-
sential elements of' a selective prosecution claim. '' "12 This evidence did
not establish the "similarly situated" requirement for discriminatory ef-
fect by identifying individuals who were not African-American and who
could have been prosecuted for the same charged offenses but were
not.113
Because the Supreme Court decided that the defendants did not pro-
vide the requisite "similarly situated" evidence to prove the discrimina-
tory effect prong of the test, the Court never even discussed how to prove
discriminatory intent." 4 Nor has any Supreme Court case since Arm-
strong defined how to prove discriminatory intent in a selective prosecu-
tion case. This leaves it difficult, if not impossible, for defendants to offer
the requisite proof for a prima facie case of selective prosecution.
108. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 469. The Court noted the costs to the government to coop-
erate with an order for discovery are the same as the cost to respond to a prima facie case
of selective prosecution; therefore, the "rigorous standard" to prove a selective prosecu-
tion claim "require[s] a correspondingly rigorous standard for discovery" to help prove a
selective prosecution claim. Id. at 468.
109. Id. at 468 (quoting United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974)).
The requisite showing to establish entitlement to discovery has been described by other
courts with phrases such as: "colorable basis," "substantial threshold showing," or "reason-
able likelihood." Id. at 468 (quoting transcript of oral argument and respondent's brief).
110. Id. at 469. Most courts of appeals require that the defendant produce some sort of
evidence to show that similarly situated defendants of other races could have been prose-
cuted but were not, which is in accord with equal protection law. Id. (citing United States
v. Parham, 16 F.3d 844, 846-47 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Fares, 978 F.2d 52, 59-60
(2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir. 1990); C.E. Carlson,
Inc. v. SEC, 859 F.2d 1429, 1437-38 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Greenwood, 796 F.2d
49, 52-53 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Mitchell, 778 F.2d 1271, 1277 (7th Cir. 1985)).
111. Id. at 469. This was also noted in Ah Sin where the Court held that the petitioner
failed to show that non-Chinese were also violating the ordinance. See Ah Sin, 198 U.S. at
507-08.





III. PROBLEMS WITH ARMSTRONG'S LACK OF DEFINITION
FOR DISCRIMINATORY INTENT
The Armstrong decision has been criticized by numerous commenta-
tors for a variety of reasons.115 First, as the Supreme Court stated in
Armstrong, the "standard is a demanding one. 11 6 Even in Armstrong,
the Court recognized that past selective prosecution cases had a "back-
ground presumption that the showing necessary to obtain discovery
should itself be a significant barrier to the litigation of insubstantial
claims. 1 1 17 The Court was correct when it noted that the showing re-
quired is a "significant barrier." 118 It is such a "significant barrier," how-
ever, that the last selective prosecution claim that was successfully
brought was the very first case that reached the Supreme Court-Yick
Wo in 1886.119
Second, it is difficult to find proof for a selective prosecution claim pri-
marily because there is rarely any direct evidence of discrimination, leav-
ing only circumstantial evidence at best. Furthermore, the circumstantial
evidence that is available is difficult to verify. The Supreme Court, more-
over, has carefully scrutinized the use of statistics as proof in selective
prosecution cases. 120 Based on the Armstrong opinion, nevertheless, data
on persons of races different from the claimant who could have been
prosecuted for the same crime, but were not, would be appropriate to
consider.1 21 However, statistics on the races of the individuals who could
have been prosecuted for the same charges are often difficult to obtain. 122
115. See generally Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of
Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13 (1998) (recognizing the broad power of prosecutors
and proposing that prosecutors through their prosecutorial decisions "remedy discrimina-
tory treatment of African-Americans in the criminal justice process"); Richard H. McAd-
ams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 605 (1998) (criticizing Armstrong's requirement that a selective prosecution claim-
ant provide "some evidence" that similarly situated members of other races were not pros-
ecuted as an "absolute condition" for discovery); Yoav Sapir, Neither Intent nor Impact: A
Critique of the Racially-based Selective Prosecution Jurisprudence and a Reform Proposal,
19 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 127 (2003) (criticizing the lack of clear definitions for selec-
tive prosecution claims and proposing a "double-stage" standard of proof to selective pros-
ecution cases); Marc Michael, Note, United States v. Armstrong: Selective Prosecution-A
Futile Defense And Its Arduous Standard of Discovery, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 675 (1998)
(explaining the background of Armstrong and criticizing the standard of review making it
nearly impossible to prove selective prosecution).
116. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463.
117. Id. at 463-64.
118. Id.
119. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 358 (1886).
120. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 470.
121. Id. (explaining that "[t]he study failed to identify individuals who were not black
and could have been prosecuted for the offenses for which respondents were charge, but
were not so prosecuted.").
122. The difficulty of obtaining relevant statistics was illustrated by the Houston Chron-
icle's traffic stop statistics for minorities in Texas from September 1, 1991, to August 31,
1994. See infra note 221. In the study, the Houston Chronicle ultimately obtained the data
on race and traffic stops in Texas from a Texas Senate committee since the Texas Depart-
ment of Public Safety never provided the Houston Chronicle with the requested data at a
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Third, the Supreme Court did not define "discriminatory intent" in
Armstrong for the purposes of a selective discrimination claim, nor has it
defined "discriminatory intent" in any other selective prosecution case
since Armstrong.123 The Court explained why the petitioners did not es-
tablish the initial prong of the test, "discriminatory effect," but the Court
avoided any discussion of "discriminatory intent" with the excuse that it
was not necessary since "discriminatory effect" was not proven. 124 This
lack of definition leaves lower courts only to speculate at what the Su-
preme Court would require as proof of "discriminatory intent" for a suc-
cessful selective prosecution claim.
IV. APPLICATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW'S MCDONNELL DOUGLAS FRAMEWORK TO
PROVE DISCRIMINATORY INTENT
Because Armstrong provides little guidance on proof of discriminatory
intent in a selective prosecution case, this Comment recommends that the
courts apply the well-known burden-shifting framework of proof first ar-
ticulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v.
Green'25 to prove discriminatory intent in employment discrimination
cases.
A. McDONNELL DOUGLAS FRAMEWORK DEFINED
The Supreme Court explained a specific burden-shifting framework in
McDonnell Douglas to be used in employment discrimination cases when
the plaintiff brings a suit for individual disparate treatment by the em-
ployer under Title VII, the ADEA, or section 1981, when there is no
direct evidence of discrimination. 126 In the case, Percy Green, an Afri-
reasonable cost (reasonable cost being less than $60 million, the price the Texas Depart-
ment of Public Safety reportedly quoted).
123. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465-70 (discussing only discriminatory effect and not
discriminatory intent).
124. See id.
125. 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). "Borrowing" from similar causes of action, of course,
is not an unknown concept in the law. In fact, "borrowing" is recognized for limitations
periods. For example, in Lampf v. Gilbertson, the Court recognized "borrowing" a statute
of limitations for a Rule 10b-5 securities fraud case. See generally 501 U.S. 350 (1991). In
Lampf, the Court noted that a securities fraud action brought under SEC Rule 10b-5 was
an implied cause of action, and accordingly, there was no specific statute of limitations for
this claim. Id. at 358. In this case, the lower courts had borrowed statute of limitations
from comparable state fraud statutes. Id. at 353. The Supreme Court explained that the
idea of borrowing limitations periods was appropriate. Id. at 355, 358-59. Nevertheless, it
decided in Lampf to borrow a limitations period from a comparable federal statute, rather
than using state laws. Id. at 362. Although limitations periods are recognized as a procedu-
ral device, a similar borrowing, related to the methodology of proof for discriminatory
intent prong of the selective prosecution test, is also rooted in well-recognized procedure.
126. 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRAC-
TICE § 2.01, at 61 (3d ed. 2002). If there is direct evidence of the employer's intent to
discriminate, a court will apply the standard explained in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228 (1989), requiring the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the
protected characteristic was a "motivating factor" and then requiring the defendant to
prove that she would have made the same decision without the discriminating factor. Id. at
1536 [Vol. 58
Proving Discriminatory Intent
can-American man who had worked as a mechanic and laboratory techni-
cian for McDonnell Douglas Corporation, lost his job when the company
downsized. 127 Green was active in the civil rights movement, and after he
was dismissed, he and other members of the Congress on Racial Equality
staged a "stall-in" by stalling their cars on the main roads leading to the
company's plant when the morning shift change was scheduled to occur,
causing a major traffic jam and great difficulty for workers to get to the
factory on time for the day.128 When McDonnell Douglas advertised a
few weeks later that it would be hiring for Green's old position, he re-
applied for his old job and was turned down.129 Green then sued Mc-
Donnell Douglas alleging he was not rehired because he was African-
American and was involved in the civil rights movement. 130
The framework that the Supreme Court explained in McDonnell Doug-
las provides a three-part analysis in which the burden of proof shifts be-
tween the plaintiff and defendant.1 3 ' This shifting of the evidentiary
burdens between the plaintiff and the defendant allows intentional dis-
crimination to be proven without direct evidence.' 32 The purpose of the
formula has been described as "to sharpen the inquiry to a 'level of speci-
ficity' which best allows the fact-finder to resolve the 'ultimate question'
of intentional discrimination. '133
In the first step, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima
facie case of racial discrimination.13 4 To prove a prima facie case, the
plaintiff must show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications.135
The Court explained in a footnote that the facts in different cases will
vary; therefore, the prima facie proof articulated in McDonnell Douglas
may not be applicable in other cases with differing facts.' 36 The Supreme
265-66. Direct evidence is "'any statement or written document showing a discriminatory
motive on its face."' Fierros v. Tex. Dept. of Health, 274 F.3d 187, 195 (5th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Portis v. First Nat'l Bank of New Albany, Miss., 34 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 1994)).
For the purposes of this Comment, the proposed framework is referred to as a McDonnell
Douglas-type analysis because the McDonnell Douglas framework serves as the original
foundation for Title VII claim analysis.
127. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 794.
128. Id. at 794-95.
129. Id. at 796.
130. Id.
131. See SULLIVAN, supra note 126, § 2.01, at 62-63.
132. ABIGAIL COOLEY MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 1:9, at 1-102
(3d ed. 2003).
133. Id. at 1-103 (quoting Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 660 (6th
Cir. 1999)).
134. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 802 n.13.
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Court later explained in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine that the burden of establishing a prima facie case is "not oner-
ous."'137 However, it serves the purpose of "eliminat[ing] the most
common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. 138
Therefore, the prima facie case "creates a presumption that the employer
unlawfully discriminated against the employee."'1 39 Thus, the Supreme
Court later acknowledged in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, that if the
trier of fact believes the plaintiff's evidence, and "[i]f the employer is si-
lent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the
plaintiff" because no issue of fact remains in the case. 140 The evidence, if
"taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscrimi-
natory reason for the adverse action.' 41
Once the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, the burden shifts to
the defendant to provide a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection.' 142 In McDonnell Douglas, the employer indicated
that it did not rehire Green due to his unlawful conduct against the em-
ployer by staging the stall-in, and the Court found that this reason was
enough to defeat the prima facie case.143
The third step in the framework shifts the burden back to the plaintiff
to have an opportunity to prove that the reason that the defendant of-
fered was actually pretextual-not the true reason why the plaintiff was
dismissed. 144 In McDonnell Douglas, the Court explained that Green
could have provided evidence that white employees, who committed acts
against the company that were of "comparable seriousness to the 'stall-
in,"' were still retained or rehired.145 Other examples of types of evi-
dence that the Court indicated would have been sufficient to rebut the
employer's reason for not rehiring Green would be information regarding
the employer's treatment of Green during his employment, McDonnell
Douglas's reaction to Green's other legitimate activities with the civil
rights movement, McDonnell Douglas's general practice and policies with
minority employees, and statistics on McDonnell Douglas's employment
policy and practice to determine whether the refusal to rehire conformed
to a general policy of discriminating against African-Americans. 46 If the
plaintiff provides evidence that convinces the fact finder that the reason
the nondiscriminatory defendant gave in step two is not true, then the fact
finder may infer that the real reason for the defendant's action was to
137. 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
138. Id. at 254.
139. Id.
140. 509 U.S. 502, 528 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 509 (emphasis in original omitted).
142. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1975).
143. Id. at 803. The Court further explained that "[niothing in Title VII compels an
employer to absolve and rehire one who has engaged in such deliberate, unlawful activity
against it;" therefore, the reason for not re-hiring Green was enough to rebut the prima
facie case. Id.





discriminate against the plaintiff. 147
B. How To APPLY McDONNELL DOUGLAS To SELECTIVE
PROSECUTION'S DISCRIMINATORY INTENT REQUIREMENT
The McDonnell Douglas framework, as acknowledged by the Supreme
Court, was "never intended to be [a] rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic,"
framework. 148 Instead, it is a flexible framework that serves as a "proce-
dural device," establishing an "order of proof and production.'
'1 49
In applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to selective prosecu-
tion claims, the two requirements for selective prosecution as stated by
the Supreme Court in Armstrong, discriminatory effect and discrimina-
tory intent, 150 can be applied within the context of the burden-shifting
framework of McDonnell Douglas. In the first step, the criminal defen-
dant would have to prove discriminatory effect, which was defined in
Armstrong.151 One must demonstrate that similarly situated individuals
who were charged with the same crime but of a different race were
treated differently than the defendant. 152 This fact could be shown by
statistics indicating the race of similarly situated persons, who were
charged with the same alleged crime but were not prosecuted. However,
as explained in Armstrong, the statistics must include data of other races.
Otherwise, a court would not consider this evidence as proving different
treatment of similarly situated persons, which defines discriminatory
effect.153
After discriminatory effect is proven in the first step, a court could in-
fer that the prosecutor acted with discriminatory motive or intent-thus
establishing a prima facie case of selective prosecution.' 54 Of course,
147. SULLIVAN, supra note 126, § 2.01, at 63.
148. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
149. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 518 (1993) (emphasis in original
omitted). See also supra note 125, explaining how "borrowing" has been recognized by the
Supreme Court for certain procedural practices.
150. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996).
151. Cf. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (explaining that the plaintiff has the bur-
den of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination); see also supra notes 134-41
and accompanying text discussing the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework.
152. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465.
153. See id. at 470 (explaining that the statistics the claimant offered did not include
information on individuals who were not African-American and could have been prose-
cuted for the same charges as the claimant, but they were not prosecuted for the charges).
154. The Supreme Court has recognized that an equal protection challenge to an em-
ployment test cannot be based solely on its racially disproportionate impact without any
proof of a racially discriminatory purpose. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),
which is not a Title VII case, the plaintiff made no claim of intentional discrimination and
tried to rely only on a study that showed a disparate impact of the employment test on
minority applicants. That, of course, was insufficient. Nevertheless, the Court recognized
that evidence of racial disparity is still relevant in proving discriminatory purpose: "This is
not to say that the necessary discriminatory racial purpose must be express or appear on
the face of the statute, or that a law's disproportionate impact is irrelevant in cases involv-
ing Constitution-based claims of racial discrimination. A statute, otherwise neutral on its
face, must not be applied so as invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race." Id. at 241
(citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). The Court also explained that in jury
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"the line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is
not ... bright. ' 155 This is why the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework provides a practical basis for showing intent. Indeed, the hun-
dred-year-old Yick Wo case remains a prime example of using statistics to
infer intent. 156
In the second step, the prosecution would have the burden of rebutting
the prima facie case for selective prosecution. 157 The government can
provide any reason for its decision to prosecute the defendant, as long as
it is not discriminatory in nature by being based on race or any other
constitutionally impermissible classification. 158 If the government does
not provide a reason, the court would presume that the prima facie case
for selective prosecution as proven by the claimant in step one was true,
and the claimant would prevail on her claim of selective prosecution.
In the third step, the burden would shift back to the defendant to prove
that the reason that the government gave was only pretextual. 159 This
can be done by offering evidence that the reason the government pro-
vided for prosecuting was not the true reason.
Although the key to the initial step is the proper use of statistics, the
use of statistics in proving discrimination has a long history. In employ-
ment discrimination cases, the use of statistics became popular in the
early 1970's.160 Since then, the complexity and level of sophistication of
the statistics has only continued to increase in trying to reveal discrimina-
tion in "work force patterns, hiring patterns, or wage differentials that
would not be apparent to the naked eye.' 161 The Supreme Court ac-
knowledged in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,
"[o]ur cases make it unmistakably clear that '[s]tatistical analyses have
served and will continue to serve an important role' in cases in which the
existence of discrimination is a disputed issue."'1 62 Furthermore, statistics
play an important role because they often are the only way to prove
"clandestine and covert discrimination" by the employer. 63
selection cases that a "prima facie case of discriminatory purpose may be proved" by a
statistical absence of one race, which will shift the burden of proof to the state. Id. "Nec-
essarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the
relevant facts .. " Id. at 242.
155. Id. at 254 (Stevens, J. concurring).
156. See supra, notes 120-22 (discussing the difficulty of obtaining relevant evidence).
157. Cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (explaining that
the employer had to provide a "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's
rejection"); see also supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
158. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03.
159. Cf. id. at 804 (explaining that the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that
the reason that the employer offered was actually pretextual); see also supra notes 144-47
and accompanying text.
160. 1 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, § 9.01 at 9-2 (2d ed. Sept.
2004) (providing explanation of the history and use of statistics in disparate treatment
litigation).
161. Id.
162. 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (quoting Mayor of Phila. v. Educ. Equal. League, 415 U.S.
506, 620 (1974)).
163. LARSON, supra note 160, § 9.01, at 9-4.
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The use of statistics to prove discriminatory intent, moreover, has been
recognized beyond Title VII cases. 164 In McCleskey v. Kemp, an equal
protection case on death penalty discrimination, the Supreme Court con-
sidered whether the death penalty was unconstitutional under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments based on a statistical study showing that
the death penalty was imposed on African-Americans more often than
Caucasians in Georgia. 165 The McCleskey Court recognized that it "has
accepted statistics as proof of intent to discriminate in certain limited con-
texts" and cited the use of statistics on proof of intent in jury selection 166
and in Title VII cases in the form of multiple-regression analysis. 167 The
Court even referred to the first selective prosecution case, Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, as an example of "cases in which a statistical pattern of discrimi-
natory impact demonstrated a constitutional violation."'1 68 The use of
statistics in McClesky, however, failed to support the alleged discrimina-
tion in death penalty sentences for two fundamental reasons. First, the
Court concluded that the decisions of a jury are inherently different be-
cause every jury is comprised of different people.1 69 Therefore, compar-
ing statistics on jury decisions about the death penalty lacked consistency.
Second, the Court observed that, unlike venire-selection or Title VII
cases (where the decisionmaker has an opportunity to explain her deci-
sions), juries do not have the opportunity to explain their decisions or the
difference in numbers of African-Americans sentenced to the death pen-
alty. 170 In a selective prosecution dispute, however, the prosecutor could
explain the decision-making process.'
71
Furthermore, it is significant that the Court in both McClesky and
Armstrong recognized that Yick Wo in 1886 was an example of the use of
statistics that were sufficient to meet the burden of proof for a selective
prosecution claim, even though the analysis was not nearly as sophisti-
cated as today's Title VII multiple-regression statistical studies. 172 As an
example of statistical proof of employment discrimination, the McClesky
court cited Bazemore v. Friday, a Title VII case accepting multiple-regres-
sion analysis to prove employment discrimination, despite claims that the
164. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
165. Id. at 279, 282-83.
166. Id. at 293 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977)).
167. Id. at 294 (citing Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400-01 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part)).
168. Id. at 294 n.12.
169. See id. at 294. This argument is overinclusive. Arguably, nearly all selective prose-
cution claims involving multiple prosecutors could be rejected on the grounds that individ-
ual prosecutors may be different.
170. Id. at 296.
171. Although in footnote 17 the McClesky opinion cites Batson v. Kentucky's observa-
tion that requiring a prosecutor to explain his own decision-making process is different
from requiring him to explain the decisions of past prosecutors, this concern, at best, is
limited to those situations where information on past prosecutions is not readily available.
See id. at 297 n.17 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
172. See id. at 294 n.12; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 466 (1996).
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employees were not similarly situated. 173 Obviously, a sophisticated mul-
tiple regression analysis in a selective prosecution case should carry simi-
lar weight, but even in Yick Wo, a case with no sophisticated multiple
regression analysis, the raw statistics were still accepted by the Supreme
Court as proof of discriminatory intent. 174 On its face, the ordinance at
issue was racially neutral and was apparently focused only on the safety
issue of whether laundries with wood burning fires should be housed in
wooden or brick buildings. 175 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court accepted
the raw statistics to prove discrimination on the fact that far more Chi-
nese laundry owners were rejected than Caucasians. 176
Since Armstrong, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that statistical
studies can support a selective prosecution claim but has explained how
certain studies fail to prove discrimination. 177 In United States v. Bass,178
the Court considered a motion for discovery on a selective prosecution
claim that cited statistics from the Department of Justice that the United
States charges African-Americans with death-eligible offenses more than
twice as often as it charges Caucasians and enters into plea bargains more
often with Caucasians than African-Americans. 179 In its analysis, the
Court discussed only discriminatory effect, holding that the Sixth Circuit
incorrectly concluded that the nationwide statistics demonstrated the sim-
ilarly situated requirement for discriminatory effect. 180 The Court ex-
plained, "[e]ven assuming that the Armstrong requirement can be
satisfied by a nationwide showing (as opposed to a showing regarding the
record of the decision makers in respondent's case), raw statistics regard-
ing overall charges say nothing about charges brought against similarly sit-
uated defendants."181 Based on this language, however, the Supreme
Court should accept statistics from the region or city where the charge
was made, as opposed to nation wide statistics. 182
173. McClesky, 481 U.S. at 294.
174. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862 (2002) (per curiam).
178. Id. at 863.
179. Id. at 863-64.
180. Id. at 863.
181. Id. at 864 (emphasis added).
182. The Fifth Circuit most recently addressed the use of statistics in selective prosecu-
tion in In re United States, 397 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2005), in which the defendant submitted a
"report" of sixty-eight other cases dealing with illegal alien smuggling and argued that they
were "similarly situated." Id. at 280. For an explanation of the facts of In re United States,
see supra note 39. The Fifth Circuit observed that this "report" was the same type of
evidence that was offered in Bass. Id. at 285. However, it noted that "sharing a charge
alone" is not enough to serve as evidence of similarly situated defendants in a selective
prosecution claim. Id. The court explained that "[a] much stronger showing, and more
deliberative analysis, is required before a district judge may permit open-ended discovery
into a matter that goes to the core of a prosecutor's function." Id. Furthermore, it ob-
served that the Hispanic co-conspirators were not similarly situated to Williams because
they were not in the cab of the truck, as was Williams, who could have stopped to allow the
illegal aliens some air or even turn on the refrigeration in the truck. Id. at 284. Therefore,
the only similarly situated co-defendant was the other defendant in the truck's cab who was
1542 [Vol. 58
Proving Discriminatory Intent
Finally, easing the burden on defendants in bringing a selective prose-
cution claim may arguably allow defendants who are guilty to escape
prosecution, but American criminal law has created rules that protect
well recognized rights, even if a guilty party may go free.183 The best
example is the Exclusionary Rule, a rule that has long been accepted to
protect defendants from evidence being used against them that was ille-
gally acquired in violation of Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment rights.
184
Furthermore, the Court in Mapp v. Ohio responded to those who criti-
cized the Exclusionary Rule explaining:
There are those who say, as did Justice (then Judge) Cardozo, that
under our constitutional exclusionary doctrine, 'the criminal is to go
free because the constable has blundered.' People v. Defore, 242
N.Y. 13, 21 (1926). In some cases this will undoubtedly be the result.
But as was said in Elkins, 'there is another consideration-the im-
perative of judicial integrity.' Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
222 (1960).185
The importance of judicial integrity applies to the Exclusionary Rule as it
should apply to selective prosecution claims. "'If the government be-
comes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."1
86
C. ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT OPINIONS IN FORD V.
WILSON 1 8 7 AND CHAVEZ V. ILLINOIS STATE POLICE18 8 THAT
CRITICIZE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
No court has yet applied the McDonnell Douglas framework in a selec-
tive prosecution case. The Seventh Circuit, however, has criticized its ap-
plication in section 1983 cases, although in dicta.189 In Ford v. Wilson, the
Seventh Circuit considered a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for race discrim-
ination by an African-American man who was arrested after a traffic stop
when he refused to sign an individual bond, which all drivers in Illinois
who receive a traffic ticket must post.'90 In addition to the section 1983
claim, the plaintiff alleged that he was stopped based on racial discrimina-
tion. 191 Judge Posner only briefly stated in one paragraph, with no analy-
also African-American. Id. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that even the defen-
dant admitted that he had not yet made out a prima facie case. The defendant himself
stated in his memorandum that he needed discovery so that he could make a prima facie
case for selective prosecution. Id.
183. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 565 (1961).
184. See id. (explaining that "the purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to com-
pel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by remov-
ing the incentive to disregard it."' (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217)
(1960)).
185. Id. at 659.
186. Id. at 659 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)).
187. 90 F.3d 245 (7th Cir. 1996).
188. 251 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2001).
189. Ford, 90 F.3d at 248-49.
190. Id. at 246-47.
191. Id. at 248.
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sis, that he does not believe employment discrimination's McDonnell
Douglas framework should be applied to section 1983 claims. 192 Judge
Posner indicated that if the framework were to be applied to section 1983
claims, anytime a law enforcement officer arrested persons of a different
race and the arrestees claimed that the arrest was groundless, they could
go to trial in federal court under section 1983.193
The brief paragraph in Ford v. Wilson does not explain how Judge Pos-
ner defines the McDonnell Douglas framework; therefore, it is difficult to
determine how he came to his conclusion. 194 However, based on his con-
clusion that the application of McDonnell Douglas to section 1983 claims
would open the floodgates to groundless claims in federal court, it indi-
cates that he did not consider the purpose that the McDonnell Douglas
framework serves in employment discrimination cases and how that pur-
pose could be applied to other discrimination cases. In the employment
discrimination context, the McDonnell Douglas framework has been de-
scribed as serving as a "process of elimination in which circumstantial
evidence is used to eliminate the usual reasons someone does not get ajob, thereby leaving the inference that the real reason was discrimina-
tion." 195 Likewise, if the McDonnell Douglas framework was applied to
cases of alleged discrimination, it would not necessarily cause courts to be
flooded with alleged racial discrimination cases. Instead, the application
of the framework would help the federal courts in the same way that it
aids employment discrimination cases-by allowing the court to eliminate
some of the most common reasons for discrimination. Nevertheless, at
some point, the need for justice is more important than the concern over
additional litigation.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit criticized Ford in Bingham v. City of
Manhattan Beach, a case in which police stopped a prominent African-
American photographer and arrested him based on an outstanding arrest
warrant for someone else with the same last name. 196 The police officer
argued that the traffic stop was a de minimus deprivation of liberty and,
relying on Judge Posner's paragraph on McDonnell Douglas, argued that
defendants could bring section 1983 claim every time they were
stopped. 197 The Ninth Circuit referred to Judge Posner's paragraph as
dicta and declined to follow it, explaining that the police officer's argu-
ment (partially based on Judge Posner's dicta) "that the de minimis doc-
192. Id. at 248-49.
193. Id. at 249.
194. Id.; see also Appellant's Main Brief at 11, Ford v. Wilson, 90 F.3d 245 (7th Cir.
1996) (No. 95-2662). The brief submitted by appellant Ford, did not mention the applica-
tion of McDonnell Douglas framework; therefore, Judge Posner was not responding to an
argument in Ford's main appellate brief. See id.
195. SULLIVAN, supra note 126, § 2.01, at 62-63. (explaining International Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), where the Court explained that the
elimination of the most common reasons not to hire (lack of qualifications or no job open-
ings available) was enough to infer that the decision to not hire was discriminatory).
196. 341 F.3d 939, 942 (9th Cir. 2003).
197. Id. at 946-47.
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trine applies here improperly conflates Fourth Amendment and section
1983 doctrine." 198
Similarly, in Chavez v. Illinois State Police, the plaintiffs in this Seventh
Circuit opinion were minorities who had been subject to traffic stops and
lengthy searches. 199 They filed a class action suit for violation of civil
rights, alleging that racial profiling was improperly used in the stops.
200
The plaintiffs submitted statistics to prove that similarly situated Cauca-
sian drivers were not subjected to the same style of stops and searches.201
During its discussion on the use of the statistics, the Seventh Circuit ex-
plained in a footnote that the plaintiffs had argued that the equal protec-
tion claims should be analyzed under the approach used in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,202 a well-known employment
discrimination case in which the court spoke highly of the use of statistics
by noting, "'[s]tatistical analyses have served and will continue to serve
an important role' in cases in which the existence of discrimination is a
disputed issue."' 20 3 However, the Chavez court dismissed the argument
by stating that the application of the analysis "is only relevant to statutory
schemes which utilize the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting frame-
work, like Title VII, and thus it can not be used here. '20 4 The Chavez
court was hesitant to borrow concepts from employment discrimination's
framework, but it overlooked that the Supreme Court already borrowed
from Title VII principles and applied them to another area of law in Bat-
son v. Kentucky205 when it explained how to challenge racially-motivated
peremptory strikes. In a footnote in the Batson decision, explaining the
198. Id. at 947.
199. 251 F.3d 612, 620 (7th Cir. 2001).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 626.
202. Id. at 638 n.8 (citing Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977)).
203. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339 (quoting Mayor of Phila. v. Educ. Equal.
League, 415 U.S. 605, 620 (1974)).
204. Chavez, 251 F.3d at 638 n.8.
205. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95-97 (1985). A Batson challenge and the Mc-
Donnell Douglas framework, moreover, are similar. In a Batson challenge, the objector
must make a prima facie case that the peremptory challenges were based on race. Id. at
96-97; see also V. HALE STARR & MARK MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION § 2.13[B], at 50-64
(3d ed. 2001) (providing explanation of Batson challenge and cases that have followed the
decision). The burden then shifts to the opponent to provide a race-neutral explanation of
why they chose to strike certain potential jury members. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. The Su-
preme Court further described this second step in footnote 20 by drawing on the second
step in McDonnell Douglas and quoting the employment discrimination case, Texas De-
partment of Community Affairs v. Burdine, to explain that "the prosecutor must give a
'clear and reasonably specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the
challenges." Id. at 98 n.20 (quoting Tex. Dep't of Comty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
258 (1980)). Finally, in the third step of a Batson analysis, the judge decides as a matter of
fact whether the strike was racially motivated. Id. at 98.
The Supreme Court in Armstrong did distinguish Batson from selective prosecution
based on the reasoning that judges are present during jury selection; therefore, judges are
arguably better able to decide whether there was discrimination, rather than evaluating the
decision-making process of a prosecutor. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,
467-68 (1996). However, Batson still provides an example of the Supreme Court borrow-
ing in a criminal equal protection claim case from employment discrimination law as it
explained in footnote 20.
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second step of a Batson challenge, the Court even quoted the employ-
ment discrimination case of Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, where the Supreme Court described the second step of the Mc-
Donnell Douglas framework. 20 6
Furthermore, the Chavez court's argument regarding application of the
employment discrimination's "statutory" framework is misplaced. It ap-
pears in the opinion under, "Use of Statistics to Show Discriminatory Ef-
fect."'20 7  Hovever, McDonnell Douglas is typically applied in
employment discrimination to show discriminatory intent, not discrimina-
tory effect.2 08 There is no mention of McDonnell Douglas in the "dis-
criminatory intent" section, where it should be located.20 9 Nor did the
court provide any explanation or any supporting citation as to why the
Seventh Circuit believes that the McDonnell Douglas framework is "only
relevant to statutory schemes" and would not be equally applicable to
other areas of law. 2 10
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
TO SELECTIVE PROSECUTION TODAY
The problem of selective prosecution based on race is an issue that is
not abating. Indeed, closely associated with the issue of selective prose-
cution is the use of racial profiling, which has gained new relevance in the
post September 11 world. 211 A recent example of the concerns raised by
selective prosecution after September 11, 2001, is the Second Circuit's
opinion on the selective prosecution of Muslims in United States v.
Alameh.21 2 Fadi Alameh was prosecuted for unlawful procurement of
206. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258). The footnote
stated, "[als we have explained in another context ... the prosecutor must give a 'clear and
reasonably specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges."
Id.
207. Chavez, 251 F.3d at 637-38.
208. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993) (applying
McDonnell Douglas framework to determine presence of discriminatory intent of new
management in firing long-time supervisor); Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612-
13 (1993) (applying McDonnell Douglas to determine presence of discriminatory intent in
the employer's decision to fire the employee before his pension benefits would vest); Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. at 252-58 (applying McDonnell Douglas to determine presence of discrimi-
natory intent in the employer's decision to deny promotion and terminate a female
employee).
209. See Chavez, 251 F.3d at 645-49.
210. Id. at 638 n.8.
211. See Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling After September 11: The Department of
Justice's 2003 Guidelines, 50 Loy. L. REV. 67, 77-81 (2004) (discussing the high use of racial
profiling as a part of immigration policy after 9/11, how public approval of racial profiling
became more accepting of racial profiling after 9/11, and treatment of non-citizen Arabs
and Muslims in the United States); Deborah A. Ramirez et al., Defining Racial Profiling in
a Post-September 11 World, 40 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1195,1205-07 (2003) (proposing defini-
tion of racial profiling); Vijay Sekhon, The Civil Rights of "Others": Antiterrorism, the Pa-
triot Act, and Arab and South Asian American Rights in Post-9/11 American Society, 8 TEX.
F. ON C.L. & C.R. 117 (2003) (examining treatment of Arabs and South Asians in the
United States since 9/11 including racial profiling, hate crimes committed against them, and
impact of the Patriot Act).
212. 341 F.3d 167, 172-75 (2d Cir. 2003).
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naturalization, 18 U.S.C. § 1425(b), by paying an American woman to
marry him as a "green card" marriage. 2 13 In his defense, he alleged that
he was being prosecuted due to his Muslim background. 214 In support of
this selective prosecution claim, he offered affidavits from immigration
attorneys stating that the type of prosecution against him was "unprece-
dented" and that prosecutions of Muslims in the United States had "dra-
matically increased" since September 11, 2001.215 In particular, he
offered statistics of all persons charged in the Southern and Eastern Dis-
tricts of New York for marriage fraud under either federal or state
laws.216 The list of over 400 names, which were grouped according to
whether the name had a Muslim or Arab sounding surname, revealed
that before September 11, 2001, 15 percent of this type of charge were
against persons with Muslim or Arab sounding names, as compared to
after September 11, 2001, where 85 percent were against persons with a
Muslim or Arab sounding surname.2 1 7 While the court referred to the
classification of the names based on whether they sounded Muslim or
Arabic as somewhat "dubious," the Second Circuit also described the re-
sults as "striking. ' 21 8 Ultimately, the court decided to not recognize the
selective prosecution claim on the ground that the government had al-
ready investigated the defendant's case for eighteen months before Sep-
tember 11, 2001.219 The court reasoned that because so much
investigation on Alameh's case had already occurred prior to September
11, 2001, the defendant would have been prosecuted in any event-not as
part of the post-September 11 increase in Muslim/Arab prosecutions il-
lustrated by the statistics.220 Although it did not recognize the defen-
dant's selective prosecution claim, the fact that the court's decision
turned on the defendant's case being investigated prior to September 11,
2001 implies that the court may be willing to affirm another post Septem-
ber 11 selective prosecution claim by a defendant with a Muslim or
Arabic sounding surname who presents similar statistics.
Racial profiling, moreover, has been evident in numerous traffic stop
213. Id. at 171.









cases22 ' as well as in shoplifting arrests.222 Disparities in sentencings
across races are also still evident. 223 Thus, the role of race in the question
of whether to prosecute cannot be ignored. For this reason, providing a
clear, defined framework on how to prove both prongs of the test will
help defendants, prosecutors, and judges effectively resolve selective
prosecution claims.
CONCLUSION
In To Kill a Mockingbird, Atticus Finch explained that "[t]he one place
where a man ought to get a square deal is in a courtroom, be he any color
of the rainbow .... ,,224 His observation that not all "color[s] of the rain-
bow" receive a "square deal" from the criminal justice system was an
accurate observation at that time and is still evidenced by the events in
Tulia, discrepancies in race in traffic stops and sentencing lengths, racial
221. Dianna Hunt, Ticket to Trouble/Wheels of Injustice?/Certain Areas Are Ticket
Traps for Minorities, Hous. CHRON., May 14, 1995, at Al. In 1995, the Houston Chronicle
compiled statistics on traffics stops in Texas between September 1, 1991, and August 31,
1994, based on 3.7 million traffic citations in records that a state Senate committee gave to
the Houston Chronicle after the Texas Department of Public Safety refused to provide
documentation. Id. The results indicated that Hispanics were disproportionately ticketed
more than any other racial minority group in Texas. Id. However, in white suburbs sur-
rounding large Texas cities and also white "enclaves" within the large cities, African-Amer-
icans also received a disproportionate number of tickets as compared to white citizens. Id.
For example, in Bellaire, a predominantly white area in southwest Houston, African-
Americans were forty-three times more likely than whites to receive a traffic ticket, even
though minorities comprised only ten percent of the Bellaire population; they received 58
percent of the tickets written from 1991 to 1994. Id.
222. Andrea Elliott, Macy's Settles Complaint of Racial Profiling for $600,000, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005, at Bi. Macy's recently entered into a consent decree to stop the use
of racial profiling of potential shoplifters in their New York stores. Id. This was after the
New York Attorney General conducted an investigation of Macy's department stores in
New York, revealing that Macy's had a "private policing system" that detained and ques-
tioned people whom they suspected of shoplifting. Id. It also showed that the majority of
people who were detained were either African-American or Hispanic. Id. The investiga-
tion started in July 2003 after a civil rights lawsuit was filed against Macy's by an African-
American woman who had been handcuffed, placed in a cell, and forced to make a false
confession of shoplifting despite having shown receipts for items she purchased. Id.
223. Gary Fields, Commission Finds Racial Disparity in Jail Sentences, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 24, 2004, at A4. A fifteen-year review of the sentencing guideline system by the U.S.
Sentencing Commission demonstrated that the percentage of minorities in the prison pop-
ulation has greatly increased since the sentencing guidelines were written. Id. The report
also indicated that minorities are more likely to serve long sentences than Caucasian pris-
oners for the same conviction, concluding that "'[ulniformity of sentencing' still hasn't
been 'fully achieved."' Id. For example, a "typical black drug trafficker" is sentenced
about ten percent longer than a "similar white drug trafficker." Id. However, this report
reflects the impact of the sentencing guidelines that have been in place for 21 years. See
Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Transforms Use of Sentence Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2005, at Al. In United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 744 (2005) the Surpeme
Court recently held that federal judges are only required to "consult" the sentencing guide-
lines and "take them into account when sentencing" and on appeal will be reviewed for
"reasonableness"-this case may change this difference in numbers or it may cause the
difference in sentencing across races to become greater. For a discussion of the impact of
the Booker decision on sentencing, see generally, Barry Coburn & Thomas Gilson, The
Road to Booker and Fanfan, ABA LITIGATION UPDATE, Feb. 2005, http://www.abanet.org/
litigation/committee/criminal/booker.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2005).
224. HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 220 (Warner Books, Inc. 1982) (1960).
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profiling, and selective prosecution. Selective prosecution prevents de-
fendants from having the opportunity to get a "square deal." The Su-
preme Court recognized this when it first established selective
prosecution as a claim in Yick Wo in 1886.225 However, due to the lack of
a clear definition of "discriminatory intent," which must be shown in a
selective prosecution claim, it is difficult for most criminal defendants to
prove the requisite discriminatory intent.
McDonnell Douglas provides a workable solution to the need to prove
discriminatory intent in a selective prosecution claim based on racial dis-
crimination. Its burden-shifting mechanism, which is familiar to the fed-
eral courts, provides a necessary tool to aid the justice system in
recognizing evidence of selective prosecution. Implementing a variation
of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to define discrimi-
natory intent in selective prosecution claims will insure that the American
system of justice is kept free of racial prejudice, and in essence, will help
all defendants get a "square deal."
225. See supra, notes 50-62 and accompanying text (discussing Yick Wo facts and the
Supreme Court's holding recognizing selective prosecution).
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